

WHEN TO DEPLOY THE FIELD ADVANCE CIVILIAN TEAM

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ABSTRACT

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The USG will continue to support operations to achieve its national security objectives. With the potential for failing states and instability throughout the world, the Obama Administration will have to decide the appropriate level of USG commitment to support operations in other nations to foster stability and enhance prosperity. The current S/CRS framework for stabilization provides for deploying FACTs but does not give a criterion to aid in the decision. Criteria for employment of FACTs, the most extensive level of U.S. commitment of interagency personnel to an operation, are useful to enable this decision. The potential criterion for employing a FACT includes five elements. These elements are: when there is a lack of a national host country government; when there is a need for multiple expertise in stability operations conducted over extensive areas; when the best training of the local institutions is through modeling behavior by direct coaching; when conditions in the regional or local areas overwhelm the existing government institutions; and finally, in concert with major military operations. The suggested criterion provides a point of departure for policy makers in the new administration concerning deployment of the emergent interagency capability.

WHEN TO DEPLOY THE FIELD ADVANCE CIVILIAN TEAM

The U.S. government (USG) has a long history of conducting nation building or stability operations. The complexity of these types of operations prompted a 1997 Presidential Decision Directive to develop an interagency approach for reconstruction and stabilization.¹ Although efforts to achieve this interagency capability have gained momentum over the past three years, the initial pool of experts is not expected to be available for deployment until late 2009. While coordination at the national level and with regional combatant commanders is continuous, the current employment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a view of potential future deployment of interagency experts. As the future strategic environment anticipates failed or failing states and continued instability throughout the world, the U.S. will likely continue to support operations in other nations that foster stability and enhance prosperity in order to improve these fragile states and promote U.S. national security.

In 2005, President Bush created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to focus the USG's response for future reconstruction and stabilization operations in foreign countries.² To date, the S/CRS has developed a framework to meet the planning and operational employment of an interagency capacity building team. This team focuses the efforts of the various executive branch departments of the USG towards enhancing the ability of another national government to be responsive to the needs of their own people. This USG reconstruction and stabilization capability provides the administration with foreign policy options. A future view reveals potential use of this capability in failed or failing states or in conjunction

with military operations. One of the strategic questions involved with future employment of this interagency capability is the degree of in-country presence. Although the PRTs vary from team to team, they generally consist of financial, law enforcement, political, engineering, and economic experts. The current model in Afghanistan and Iraq provides for PRTs at the provincial level with some work done at the city level, usually the key provincial urban areas.³ This level of support requires tremendous resources. The current framework designates these local in-country teams as Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs). As the S/CRS develops the organization and personnel capability for reconstruction and stabilization operations, criteria development to guide employment of local in-country teams is beneficial. Currently, there is not a set of criteria or rules for employing FACTs. A standard criterion may enable planners to match this emergent capability to the appropriate situation on the ground.

Any recommended criterion should be formed by both viewing the future strategic environment and by understanding the current framework and structure of the S/CRS. In addition, lessons learned from the current PRTs and the experiences of foreign-focused United States Agency for International Development (USAID), USG agencies, and international organizations provide useful data for developing criteria. By taking this information as a whole, it appears the potential criterion for employing a FACT includes five elements. These elements are: when there is a lack of a national host country government; when there is a need for multiple expertise in stability operations conducted over extensive areas; when the best training of the local institutions is through modeling behavior by direct coaching; when conditions in the regional or local

areas overwhelm the existing government institutions; and finally, in concert with major military operations.

A review of leader discussions and key documents of the past three years reveals a complex future. One of the recurring themes of the future strategic environment is one of persistent conflict and failed states. Neither the recent Bush Administration nor the current Obama Administration limits “engagement” to a strictly military approach. General Peter W. Chiarelli, the current Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, when reflecting upon his experience in Iraq as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander, believes interagency operations and nation building is in the future. He sees the current complex and ambiguous interagency environment in Iraq and Afghanistan as a baseline line in which “our national interests may require us to engage in the full range of military and interagency operations and we must embrace the concept of nation building.”⁴ In preliminary findings from The Project on National Security Reform, the group highlighted several security dynamics and elements in the future strategic environment. Notable elements include weak and failing states, individuals and organizations using the benefits of globalization, population movements causing ethnic and cultural tensions, and a competition for energy resources.⁵ United States’ engagement across this spectrum of potential problems requires use of all elements of national power and expertise from multiple departments of government.

Another aspect of the future environment is stalled progress of developing countries in the world. The Department of State and United States Agency for International Development Joint Strategic Plan covering 2007 through 2012 highlighted the need for governance capacity in failed states as well as in states with an internal

opposition party. A stated goal of the plan is to use U.S. resources to improve the conditions in failed and failing states in order to decrease potential locations for terrorist safe havens. The plan states, “The heightened threat of terrorism from states with despotic leaders, weak institutions, or underdeveloped capacity requires that we work to empower people through accountable, legitimate, and democratic governance.”⁶ The mission statement of USAID and the Department of State (DoS) clearly states their role in “helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international.”⁷

This view of the world demonstrates the complexity of the environment and the difficulty to have a single approach or solution. The Joint Operating Environment 2008 published by United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) came to this same conclusion, stating, “there is no clear pattern for the economic and political trouble that beset these states.”⁸ This future view of failing states and rising non-state actors sets up the requirement for stability operations as a tool available to the USG to influence the situation. These likely scenarios reinforce the prudence of the on-going actions of the S/CRS to establish a framework for an interagency approach to stability operations.

Even as there is more fidelity concerning the future environment, there are still challenges to developing a coherent approach. James R. Locher, Executive Director of the Project on National Security Reform, highlighted two problem areas for the immediate future. The first challenge is “to integrate the diverse expertise and capabilities of the departments and agencies.”⁹ The second challenge is “that civilian departments and agencies are under-resourced and culturally and administratively

unprepared for national security roles.”¹⁰ The military recognized these challenges to an interagency approach and the current situation. The National Military Strategy (NMS) signed in 2006 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Meyers, highlights that the threat to the U.S. does not reside solely with the foreign militaries, but will “range from states to non-state organizations to individuals.”¹¹ With these adversaries operating in a more complex battlespace today and in the future, “This battlespace places unique demands on military organizations and interagency partners, requiring more detailed coordination and synchronization of activities both overseas and at home.”¹²

The military is not the only element of the government focused on setting the conditions for achieving national objectives. President Bush in the National Security Strategy outlined the requirement for lasting peace and stability, stating, “Success often depends on the early establishment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces and a functioning justice and penal system. Governance capacity is critical to establishing rule of law and a free market economy.”¹³ This recognition of the importance of good governance in foreign countries and the link to U.S. national security has led to a steady improvement of USG capability to assist other nations in developing their institutions and good governance capacity.

In contrast to current opinion, efforts to improve the USG’s ability to assist other nations in governance and stability are not a post-9/11 occurrence. In 1997 under the guidance of President Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 56 outlined an interagency approach for nation building outside of the U.S. The policy focused on interagency support to a current situation as ordered by the President of the United

States, proscribing a lead department but with reliance on each executive branch department providing the expertise and resources as required.¹⁴ As a subsequent document, President Bush's National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 addressed the lack of planning capacity in the interagency area. NSPD 44 created the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to assist the Secretary of State to "coordinate and lead integrated United States government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities."¹⁵ NSPD 44 directed twelve functions that focus on planning, coordination, and identifying resources for implementing an interagency approach to stabilization and reconstruction. The President directed the Secretary of State to "coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict."¹⁶

In January 2008, Ambassador John Herbst, the current Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, testified to the Senate regarding NSPD 44 implementation. He described the Interagency Management System as the overarching framework, providing for a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) that is a Washington-based decision-making body that facilitates "effective and timely decisions, planning, and mobilization of resource."¹⁷ This body provides a USG approach to each reconstruction and stabilization mission. An Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) is a civilian planning team that works with a Combatant Command to "harmonize civilian and military planning, processes, and operations."¹⁸ The IPC draws on experts

from across the government in order to develop a means to achieve the national objectives of a potential or directed mission.

The team that implements the reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) plan “on the ground,” so to speak, is the Advance Civilian Team (ACT). The ACT reports to the Chief of Mission in the relevant country to augment the embassy capability. The ACT deploys based on a CRSG recommendation to the Secretary of State or a request from the Embassy or Chief of Mission. As a skills-specific team, it provides surge capacity to support Chiefs of Mission and country team efforts that develop, integrate, and execute reconstruction and stabilization plans.¹⁹ Additionally, the ACT could employ multiple “FACTs, similar to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that have been operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, to coordinate R&S programs at the provincial or local level, with or independently of a military or international peacekeeping effort.”²⁰ The decision to employ an ACT, or FACTs in conjunction with the ACT, drives USG’s resources and level of commitment for the situation.

Currently, supplemental budgets fund the office of the S/CRS and its efforts to train its cadre of civilian experts. True implementation of an interagency capability depends on funding within the request for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. Former Secretary of State Rice outlined the requirements in July 2008 stating, “The President requested nearly \$249 million of funding in his Fiscal Year 2009 budget.”²¹ Part of this budget funds 250 civilian experts of the Civilian Response Corps, capable of rapid deployment; another 2,000 members of the federal government, on standby, designated to support worldwide operations as directed by the President; and a reserve element consisting of civilian volunteers, with expertise required by the mission, from across the

country.²² Full funding for this initiative will provide a capable interagency team available for employment as required by mission and duration.

A review of the U.S. Army's Stability Operations Field Manual (FM 3-07) provides a composite of what PRTs are currently doing with respect to reconstruction and stabilization. Since creation or employment of a FACT has yet to occur, the PRTs provide a representative model of an actual organization that operates in conjunction with the military forces. FM 3-07 highlights PRTs' focus on local populations in a post-conflict environment as well as their importance to the overall stability operation: "A PRT is an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the functions of security, governance, and economics to the host-nation."²³ The PRTs provide the local commander with governance and economic expertise, thus allowing the military forces to focus on security. A PRT focuses on local communities while strengthening the host-nation government in order to quickly transition to self-governance.²⁴ These local efforts focus on developing and improving institutions, which leads to long-term stability.

Dr. Richard McCall, serving on the Texas A&M University panel discussing security reform, suggested his concept for nation building, based on his decade of service at USAID as a senior policy advisor. He highlighted the need for building institutions within failed and failing nations: "This institution building is fundamental to the maintenance of coherence and order during times of stress."²⁵ FM 3-07 also highlights the significance of institution building and the role the military plays in providing support to other actors. The Army identified 38 essential tasks for stability operations; 26 of those 38 tasks are tasks the military would support another agency in execution. Additionally, 13 of the 38 stability tasks focus on building institutions and

reinforce the need for local-level implementation.²⁶ When the United States decides to commit an ACT or FACT, those 26 supported tasks represent the types of task the teams undertake in stability operations. Each situation dictates the tasks and the executing element. The key point to understand is the U.S. Army identified the essential tasks, including tasks focused on institution building, and acknowledges in its doctrine that the military is not the lead agent to accomplish a majority of those tasks, but will support another agency. Although the latest U. S. Army doctrine focuses on stability operations, the DoS always focuses on promoting U.S. interests, which includes stability throughout the world. USAID is the DoS's main agency for distributing aid.

USAID currently employs implementing partners for many operations it conducts throughout the world without deploying a significant contingent of personnel from the home office. Additionally, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often conduct successful operations in areas where there is not a functioning government or security. A review of these types of organizations could provide a method for accomplishing USG stabilization and reconstruction goals without employing a FACT or provide insight when to employ a FACT.

USAID is the "U.S. government's lead institution for reducing poverty in the developing world."²⁷ USAID uses NGOs, international organizations (IO), and private organizations to implement programs that meet the strategic security goals of the U.S. This approach capitalizes on the experience and expertise of other organizations throughout the world and allows the U.S. to influence local conditions by funding programs that are compatible with U.S. objectives. USAID has programs in approximately 100 developing countries by working with private voluntary organizations

(PVOs), local groups, American businesses, international organizations, trade and professional associations, and other USG agencies. As explained in the USAID primer, “Through contracts and grant agreements, USAID partners with more than 3,500 companies and over 300 U.S.-based PVOs.”²⁸ This USAID-approach operates within the existing Embassy organization on a case-by-case basis. USAID projects focus on governance, democracy, human rights, economic development, or other relevant needs in order to foster stability and support USG interests. In its Failed States Strategy, USAID highlighted a key gap in its own capabilities, that of strengthening the sources of governance and weak institutions, both private and governmental.²⁹

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), often referred to as Doctors without Borders, is an NGO that operates worldwide in over 60 countries, providing medical care to the same populations that USAID target. From MSF’s objectives and policy statement, the organization “must remain scrupulously independent of governments, as well as religious and economic powers.”³⁰ Many other NGOs have the same operating constraints as MSF. These organizations provide excellent support to local populations; however, their own charters limit their coordination with USG agencies. Similarly, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) published a handbook that describes how to conduct an assessment that includes organizing teams for local employment. The handbook covers situations where there is a national society as well as situations where national support does not exist. Although the handbook stresses combining resources with other agencies, the host country, and the local officials to the fullest extent possible, it also recommends NGOs not work with others when “collaboration jeopardizes the principles of neutrality and impartiality.”³¹ However,

this recommendation may hamper unity of effort by the USG when employing a FACT. Given the U.S. has a publically stated national security strategy that many NGOs and IOs would not view as either neutral or impartial, future collaboration to achieve unity of effort may not be feasible.

The IFRC handbook also highlights that not every situation requires an external intervention. According to this document, there are three potential responses for each humanitarian crisis. The first response is there is no need for an intervention because the governance capacity of the affected population is sufficient to deal with the crisis. The second response may indicate a need for intervention but the Red Cross/Red Crescent is not the appropriate organization to undertake the crisis for a variety of reasons. The third response is there is a need for intervention and the Red Cross/Red Crescent is the appropriate agency.³² These potential responses highlight that the Red Cross/Red Crescent, as well as other NGOs, IOs, and PVOs, do not automatically commit their resources to every situation. In contrast, there appears to be an implication the USG must maintain a capability for worldwide response whenever various situations threaten US national security.

NGOs, IOs, and PVOs, particularly ones that focus on humanitarian or emergency response situations, have developed formal structures and guidelines for their operations. Any structure developed by S/CRS should incorporate the best practices of these organizations. Cooperative Assistance for Relief Everywhere (CARE) International is another organization that provides support to humanitarian crises in conjunction with USAID. It has a tiered, organizational structure that is similar to the S/CRS framework. CARE International operates a CARE Emergency Group (CEG) that

coordinates and oversees “CARE International’s global humanitarian emergency responses.”³³ Similar to the plan for the ACT, CARE has established a CARE Emergency Response Team (CERT) that allows for the quick mobilization of qualified personnel to respond to emergencies. Since 2002, CERTs have worked in Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Chad, Sudan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Niger to list a few countries.³⁴

The IFRC also developed a global emergency response team. The key observation from reviewing the global capability of the Red Cross/Red Crescent is how similar the structure of the two organizations is to the nascent FACT model. The Red Cross/Red Crescent relies on their Field Assessment and Coordination Team to develop the implementation plan for each disaster response. This Field Assessment and Coordination Teams are similar to the ACT within the S/CRS scheme. The Red Cross/Red Crescent team draws on a pool of personnel trained and prepared to deploy on 24-hour notice. The team’s mission is to compile an assessment report, a plan of action, and recommend the appropriate Red Cross/Red Crescent response.³⁵ The Red Cross/Red Crescent employs Emergency Response Units (ERU) to respond to disasters and implement relief programs. The ERUs have developed into nine different highly specialized units, all using standardized equipment and pre-trained personnel.³⁶ The ERU appears to be equivalent to the FACT in the S/CRS model.

In reviewing the operations of IOs and similar organizations, several items are apparent that may apply to the S/CRS model. One item is the need for rapid, worldwide employment of teams. The second item suggests the team requires some level of expertise. The third reflects a tiered structure must exist for developing and implementing operations. Fourth, these organizations attempt to remain neutral and

impartial; setting their agenda by the assistance they provide to people in need. USAID, one of many USG agencies, already leverages the first three items to implement programs to achieve its strategic goals in support of the National Security Strategy. However, the fourth item is the one that limits the USG's ability to collaborate with other-than-government organizations.³⁷ When the U.S. needs to influence a nation to achieve a security objective, the NGOs, IOs, and similar organizations are not always eager to collaborate. This situation leads the United States to employing its own personnel or organizations while building upon the existing programs in the host nation.

Upon review of the future strategic environment and experiences of NGOs and IOs, it appears the on-going S/CRS-led efforts will result in an interagency capability for reconstruction and stabilization operations. The frameworks for strategic and operational employment of USG capability exist and are currently in use. S/CRS has participated in interagency exercises with U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command. Additionally, the USG employed elements of a CRSG for the Sudan and the crisis in Georgia in 2008.³⁸ Although use of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan proximate the employment of a FACT, that model does not necessarily represent the conditions for future employment. For example, options other than the FACT might include use of the ACT out of the Embassy or employment of a single agency such as the Department of Defense or USAID.

The purpose of the ACT is to integrate planning, resource allocation, and operations for the ambassador in order to achieve unity of effort.³⁹ In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted the significance of an interagency and international effort to assist nations and local populations to "promote local participation in

government and economic programs to spur development” as part of the National Defense Strategy.⁴⁰ This focus on the significance of good local governance in the defense strategy demonstrates the importance of unity of effort by non-military agents that is precisely the role the FACT. An ACT would employ a FACT in order to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation on the ground in the host nation in order to achieve unity of effort. The mission of the FACT would be to understand the requirements on the ground, determine any limitations for planned operations, and provide feedback on the execution of the operations. The FACT also provides oversight for execution of U.S. funds. The FACT provides guidance in governance, rule of law, essential services, and economic development.

One criterion for employment of a FACT is the lack of a host nation national government. One of the lessons from Iraq is that “developing the capacity of people and systems is as important as bricks and mortar reconstruction.”⁴¹ A functioning national government is essential to facilitate aid distribution throughout the country, to provide basic services, and coordinate government services. At the national level, a government bureaucracy provides planning for future requirements and prioritization of ongoing actions for resource allocation. Ambassador Henry L. Clarke, who served as the head of the Office of Provincial Affairs in the Embassy in 2007 and supervised all PRTs in Iraq, highlighted this phenomenon. Based on his experience, he stressed the importance of PRTs in enabling the local governments to achieve a secure and prosperous society “with or without coherent leadership from the center.”⁴² In nations without an existing national-level bureaucracy, the ACT will assist the host nation with the planning and prioritization functions. While the ACT is focused on the national-level bureaucracy, it

requires direct links to a functioning local host nation government. Without the local linkage, it will be difficult for the ACT to effectively plan and prioritize operations. Without effective communication to determine the status on the ground, understand the requirements, and quantify the limitations, the ACT in conjunction with the national government will not develop executable plans. A FACT is the element that can provide the cohesive information on the current situation, make judgments on requirements, and quantify any limitations for the ACT. Using common communications systems and standard operating procedures, the FACT provides oversight and feedback on the current operations. Without the FACT, the ACT will produce plans that are based on the input of a non-functioning national government and whatever data the ACT can find.

Another criterion for employment of the FACT is when there is the need for multiple expertises in stability operations conducted over extensive areas. These areas may be large, such as Afghanistan; or consist of areas that are not readily accessible, such as the islands in the Philippines. Military forces are ideal for operating over the extended and diverse terrain due to their ability to remain self-sufficient, with their own communications and logistics structure. What the military lacks is the interagency expertise that is inherent in a FACT. An ACT, which operates as part of the embassy, does not possess the communications, logistics, or movement capability to operate over large or isolated terrain. To be successful, the ACT still requires an on-the-ground presence of a FACT.

A third criterion suggested is when the best training of the local institutions is through modeling behavior by direct coaching. In Iraq, for example, some PRTs found that teaching governance and rule of law is difficult when the “old ways” or local

customs are entrenched. Stuart Bowen, the Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction, reported to Congress in October 2007 that the incremental progress seen in budget execution directly resulted from “coaching their provincial counterparts to execute their province’s capital budget allocations.”⁴³ PRTs in Iraq found that working directly with local officials was effective in fostering transparency and focusing on the needs of the people. The Salah Al-Din PRT leader reported partnering with the local investment commission and provincial authorities to improve economic growth and infrastructure projects.⁴⁴ Without the regular direct contact, multiple times a week, the local officials gave in to “backroom politics” and the influence of tribal leaders. The PRT leader in Diyala province reported similar progress with a transparent contract awarding process and support to 40 trials in 2008.⁴⁵

Another criterion for employment of a FACT when is the conditions in the regional or local areas overwhelm the existing government institutions. Many NGOs will operate under these conditions during a humanitarian crisis in order to augment the host nation government. However, distribution of humanitarian aid, whether by NGOs or the host government, does not insure success of the local government institutions. Providing assistance to governments that do not have the capacity to surge their operations can sometime undermine their credibility with their own people as well as potentially result in the perception of incompetence of the nations providing aid. The ACT, in conjunction with the national government, may develop a plan that meets all the needs of the local populace for achieving any objective from enhanced rule of law to improved governance to humanitarian aid, but without local resources or leadership available for execution, the plan will not achieve the desired results. The FACT can step

in to provide that additional level of supervision and support to the local government. The FACT provides feedback on the ongoing operations, identifies new requirements, and assesses the impact of limitations.

The final criterion for employment of a FACT is in concert with major operations conducted by the military. James Carafano, an assistant director at the Heritage Foundation with a focus on defense and national security issues, documented that the U.S. military has conducted an operation related to peacekeeping, peacemaking, or post-conflict occupation roughly every two years since the end of the Cold War.⁴⁶ In respect and awareness of this history, the U.S. Army includes stability operations as well as offensive and defensive operations, as part of full spectrum operations in its recently published FM 3-0, Operations.⁴⁷ The USG can expect that any future employment of the joint force will include some aspect of stability operations. As described earlier, execution of any of the 26 stability tasks requires interagency expertise. The FACT is the relevant interagency team that can provide the non-military expertise and advice to the tactical commander during military operations for furthering the overall objectives of the campaign. Additionally, “soft-power” programs orchestrated by USAID and PRTs in Iraq, such as microloans, rule of law initiatives, and women’s rights education programs, are instrumental in achieving national goals.⁴⁸ The FACT provides parallel planning with the ACT to coordinate achievement of those US objectives.

Employing a FACT has inherent risk associated with the decision regardless of the criteria. Placing a FACT on the ground requires a greater level of logistical support, greater number of trained personnel available for worldwide deployment, and a

requirement for force protection measures. The level of logistical support for multiple FACTs employed in a country to support the ACT may detract from the ongoing operations of the ACT. The ACT is responsible for providing command, control, and support to the FACTs, relying on the Embassy or Chief of Mission structure in relatively developed locations. Employment of a FACT decreases the pool of experts available for near time employment for other contingencies. Regardless of the security situation on the ground in the host nation, the USG provides protection for American personnel, varying levels for varying threats. During combat operations, the military is likely to provide the force protection and may severely limit the freedom of movement for the FACT. In addition, some degree of criminal or terrorist threat exists in the nations where the U.S. will employ ACTs and FACTs. The criminal or terrorist threat also requires an assessment and implementation of measures appropriate for the situation.

The USG will continue to support operations to achieve its national security objectives. With the potential for failing states and instability throughout the world, the Obama Administration will have to decide the appropriate level of USG commitment to support operations in other nations to foster stability and enhance prosperity. The current S/CRS framework for stabilization provides for deploying FACTs but does not give a criterion to aid in the decision. Criteria for employment of FACTs, the most extensive level of U.S. commitment of interagency personnel to an operation, are useful to enable this decision. The previously suggested criterion provides a point of departure for policy makers in the new administration concerning deployment of the emergent interagency capability.

Endnotes

¹ *Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 56 White Paper*, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," May 20, 1997, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm> (accessed February 27, 2009).

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